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WISCONSIN'S MUNICIPAL LABOR
LAW: A NEED FOR CHANGE
CHARLES C. MULCAHY*
GARY M. RUESCH**

I. THE SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE
Elected officials, public employee unions and the public
have been struggling during the past twenty years to devise an
equitable procedure to resolve collective bargaining and contract administration differences between public employers and
public employees. During this period the relationship between
the parties has matured in many respects; however, the ultimate question of how public sector collective bargaining disputes should be resolved remains a problem.
This article covers the Wisconsin experience. As the first
state to pass a public employee bargaining law, Wisconsin has
become the testing ground for numerous and varied public
sector bargaining and contract administration procedures.
The most recent experience, Mediation-Arbitration (MED/
ARB), is now being reviewed by the Wisconsin Legislature.
The primary question raised by this article is whether public
employment bargaining impasse situations should continue to
be resolved through compulsory binding arbitration.
Chapter 178 of the Wisconsin Laws of 1977 (MED/ARB
Law) extended compulsory binding arbitration of bargaining
impasses to nearly all municipal employees in Wisconsin.
Public safety employees (law enforcement and firefighting
personnel) continued to be covered by binding arbitration
under different statutory provisions,1 while state employees
are not subject to compulsory binding arbitration in any
form.2
* B.S., 1959, Marquette University; J.D., 1962, Marquette University; President of
the firm of Mulcahy & Wherry, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Adjunct Professor of

Law, Marquette University; Labor Counsel, National Association of Counties; Member, Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors (1964-1976).
** B.A., 1977, Marquette University; J.D., 1980, Marquette University; Member
of the firm of Mulcahy & Wherry, S.C., Wausau, Wisconsin; Chairman, Labor Negoti-
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1. Wis. STAT. §

2. Wis.

STAT.

111.77 (1971).

§ 111.80-.97 (1971). See also note 23 infra.
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The law in Wisconsin, before the enactment of compulsory
binding arbitration, served public employers, public employees and the public quite well. From 1959, when the original
law was enacted, to 1978, when the compulsory binding arbitration amendments went into effect for most public employees, significant and laudatory improvements in the bargaining
and contract administration processes were made. The vast
majority of all disputes were resolved through effective collective bargaining; 3 however, a few isolated, but highly publicized
public sector strikes 4 caused the Wisconsin Legislature to enact, perhaps prematurely, the MED/ARB Law.
3. The number of public employers affected by municipal strikes since the inception of the Municipal Employment Relations Act has been relatively miniscule. A
comparison of the actual number of strikes in relation to the number of public employers yields the following result:
TABLE 1

Fiscal Year

Public Employee
Strikes Per Year

Percent of Public Employers
Not Subject to Strike
Activity Based on 1,118
Public Employers

1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77

12
5
19
25
7
8
7

99.8
99.6
98.3
97.8
99.4
99.3
99.4

The number of strikes per year was compiled from the annual reports of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. The statistics are based on fiscal years beginning July 1 and ending June 30. There are 1,118 public employers in Wisconsin at the
following levels: 187 cities, 391 villages, (according to WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, 1979-80 BLUE BOOK 777,780 (1979)), 72 counties, 50 K-8 school districts, 373 K-12 school districts, 10 union high schools, 16 VTAE, and 19 CESA, (according to WISCONSIN DEPARTmENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, [1979-80] WISCONSIN
PUBLIC SCHOOL DIRECTORY 1-117 (1979)). It can safely be concluded that the vast
majority of municipal employer-employee relationships in that period were devoid of
strike activity.
4. The highly publicized strike in the Hortonville School District, which involved
95 teachers during the 1973-74 school year, ultimately resulted in the termination of
all striking personnel. The employer subsequently replaced these teachers. [1973-75]
Wis. EMPLOYMENT REL. COMM'N BIENNIAL REP., at 21. The disruptive influence of
public employee strikes was proven to the legislature in the lengthy 14 day strike by
20,000 state employees in 1976. Milwaukee Sentinel, July 6, 1977, at 1, col. 1. Ironically, the MED/ARB Law, which was enacted in the fall of 1977, excludes state employees from coverage of binding mediation arbitration procedures.
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This article will focus attention upon whether the Wisconsin MED/ARB Law has served the public interest and the interest of the immediate parties. Of paramount importance to
all concerned is the positive and orderly resolution of municipal labor problems. One unresolved question is whether
outside parties or the parties themselves should resolve bargaining impasses. The Wisconsin experience sheds light upon
that question.
Wisconsin adopted the nation's first law governing local
collective bargaining in 1959. 5 The Wisconsin Legislature
thereafter provided a series of additional dispute resolution
procedures.' Until recently, collective bargaining remained the
cornerstone of the Municipal Employment Relations Act
(MERA) and encouraged the voluntary settlement of disputes. Elected municipal officials were thereby held accountable to the public." On January 1, 1978, however, a new law
became effective which seriously weakened the effectiveness of
the collective bargaining process in Wisconsin. It provided
compulsory binding interest arbitration as a final means to
TABLE 2
1976-77 Strike Activity Summary
Number of Days on
Employees Strike

Worker
Days Lost

Employer

Employees Involved

Superior Schools

Teachers

385

18

6,930

Racine Schools

Teachers

1,500

35

52,500

Racine Schools

Maintenance

230

35

8,050

Milwaukee Schools

Teachers

6,000

17

102,000

Milwaukee Schools

Aides

1,800

17

30,600

Milwaukee Schools

Substitutes

900

17

15,300

Milwaukee Schools

Accountants

15

17

255

[1975-1977] Wis. EMPLOYMENT REL. COMM'N BIENNIAL REP., at 26.

5. 1959 Wis. Laws ch. 509, § 1.
6. In 1961 non-binding fact finding was established. 1961 Wis. Laws ch. 663, § 2.
In 1963 the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board was authorized to provide mediation services. 1963 Wis. Laws chs. 6 and 87. In 1971 compulsory final and binding
interest arbitration for law enforcement and firefighting personnel was established.
1971 Wis. Laws chs. 246 and 247.
7. See text accompanying notes 46-73 infra.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64:103

settle disputes involving municipal employees other than law
enforcement and firefighting personnel.8
The MED/ARB Law is not consistent with the historical
development of MERA. It was enacted in response to political
pressure when the state was experiencing a few illegal public
employee strikes.9 Commendably, the Legislature anticipated
the need to reconsider this impasse resolution procedure by
writing a "sunset" provision into the law. 10 As the date of the
"sunset" provision draws near, the Wisconsin Legislature is
evaluating the MED/ARB Law to determine whether its practical application has served the interests of the public. The
"sunset" provision creates a unique opportunity to review the
effectiveness of public sector collective bargaining under
MED/ARB in Wisconsin.
This article will examine the development of Wisconsin's
Municipal Employment Relations Act. Special attention will
be given to its reliance on collective bargaining as its foundation, and also to the development of alternative impasse resolution procedures. In addition, the practical effect of MED/
ARB on the public, municipal employers, unions and municipal employees will be discussed. The article will conclude that
the public interest would be best served by expanding the
right to strike of certain public employees and by curtailing
the use of MED/ARB as a method of dispute resolution.
II. THE MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT
A.

Development

The foundation of the Municipal Employment Relations

8. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 178. Interest arbitration is arbitration of new contract terms
(employer-employee "interest"). Interest arbitration should be distinquished from
grievance arbitration, which is usually the final step in a grievance procedure in which
the arbitrator makes a definite decision on an issue in dispute arising under the terms
of an existing labor contract.
9. See notes 3 and 4 supra.
10. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 178, § 17(1) provides:
Section 111.70(1)(nm), (3)(a)7 and (b)6, (4)(cm) and (7m) of the statutes, as
created by this act, shall be in effect from the effective date of this act until
October 31, 1981, and after that date are void, except that any proceeding
under such provisions pending on October 31, 1981, shall continue to be subject to such provisions, until finally settled between the parties or adjudicated
by arbitration, the Employment Relations Commission or a court of competent
jurisdiction.
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Act (MERA) is collective bargaining. As such, the development of collective bargaining under MERA is the natural
background against which MED/ARB should be evaluated. In
addition, by understanding the evolution of collective bargaining under MERA, changes consistent with its underlying philosophy can be developed to strengthen public sector collective bargaining in Wisconsin.
1. 1959: The Original Act
The original MERA established certain basic rights and
procedures. Although coverage of the Act was limited,11 it was
significant because it gave municipal employees the right to
self-organize, to affiliate with labor organizations of their own
choice, and to negotiate with their municipal employers. 2
MERA limited these negotiations to questions of wages, hours
and conditions of employment.13 The original enactment contained no impasse resolution procedures, no involvement of
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (WERB), 4 and
no requirement to negotiate in good faith.
2. 1961: Mediation And Fact Finding
In 1961 the scope of MERA was significantly expanded.
The new law expressly prohibited public employee strikes, 5
and the WERB was granted the power to administer portions
of the Act. The WERB had the authority to function as a mediator in disputes 6 and to administer the fact finding provision in the law. 17 Mediation by the WERB was authorized
only after a request by both parties. Fact finding, however,
could be initiated unilaterally under limited circumstances. 8
11. For example, Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (1959) was silent on the prohibition against

inclusion of supervisory employees in the bargaining unit, the definition of "supervisory," "confidential," and "craft" employees, the scope of bargaining, and the contract bar rule.
12. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(2) (1959).
13. Id.
14. The WERB subsequently was renamed the Wisconsin Employment Relations

Commission (WERC).
15. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(1) (1961).
16. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(b) (1961). See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra for
a discussion of mediation.
17. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(f) (1961). See text accompanying note 40 infra for a

discussion of fact finding.
18. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(e) (1961).
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The addition of mediation and fact finding to MERA was
intended to encourage the collective bargaining process. Both
procedures complement the process and facilitate voluntary
settlements:
Mediation should be viewed as a continuation of the bargaining process rather than as a substitute for it. Because
mediation neither alters the bargaining positions of the parties nor favors any specific group, it is adaptable to, and can
operate within, a given political power structure. It is useful
not only for its intrinsic value as an impasse procedure but
also as a tool for educating parties inexperienced in
bargaining.
Fact-finding . .. is fundamentally designed to persuade

the parties to come to a voluntary agreement within the parameters of the public sector collective bargaining process.19
MERA, as amended in 1961, was the basis for the evolution of collective bargaining for the remainder of the decade.
The recognition of the rights of public employees and the establishment of procedures to resolve collective bargaining impasses served as the catalyst for the growth of public sector
labor organizations. The law required voluntary agreements
between the parties since it did not provide for compulsory,
binding impasse procedures. This statutory scheme recognized
the common interests of both parties and encouraged them to
work together:
Public management and public unions (the parties) face
many similar obstacles in attempting to resolve municipal
labor problems. Problem resolution, whether in contract negotiation or administration, should be the goal of both parties. When the parties work together to resolve municipal
labor problems, they probably will provide better municipal
service at a more reasonable cost and the public employee
will be treated fairly.
Perhaps the reasons may be different, but both parties
have a similar interest in serving the public. If efficient and
effective public services are provided, both parties will bene19. Mulcahy & Rader, Collective Bargainingin Public Employment: The County
View, [1976] COUNTY Y.B. 150, 156 (Nat'l Ass'n of Counties/Int'l City Management
Ass'n eds. 1976).
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fit. If labor problems result in disruptive, inefficient
or sus20
pended services both parties will ultimately suffer.
Voluntary collective bargaining capitalizes on a commonalty of interest. The dialogue occurring within the collective
bargaining process increases understanding and solidifies the
relationship between the parties. During the 1960's, MERA
relied on this relationship and the mutual interests of the parties to facilitate the voluntary settlement of municipal labor
disputes. Collective bargaining was firmly established in practice as well as in theory as the foundation of municipal labor
relations.
3.

1971: Protective Services Arbitration

As municipal labor relations became more complex, the
WERC was called upon to provide additional assistance to the
parties.2 1 In 1971, comprehensive revisions and additions were
made to MERA by the legislature.2 2 These changes can be divided into two categories: (1) definitions and procedural sections to clarify MERA; (2) final and binding compulsory municipal interest arbitration (MIA) for law enforcement and
firefighting personnel.23
Prior to the 1971 MIA amendments, law enforcement personnel were not considered "municipal employees. '24 They
were expressly granted the limited use of fact finding, but by
statutory definition were not entitled to other municipal employee rights in MERA.2 5 Police, deputy sheriffs and county
20. Mulcahy, Structuring and Techniques for an Effective Public Employee PerLABOR RELATIONS IN WISCONSiN 3, 6 (C. Mulcahy ed.
1979).
21. Polasek, Labor Relations in Municipal Employment - The Maturing Process, 32 MiLWAUKEE BAR AsS'N GAvEL 49 (April 1972).

sonnel Program, in MUNICIPAL

22. 1971 Wis. Laws chs. 124, 246, 247, 307 and 336.
23. In addition, Wis.

STAT.

§ 111.70(4)(jm) (1971) established a compulsory bind-

ing interest arbitration procedure for members of the Milwaukee Police Department
which was separate from the procedure in Wis. STAT. § 111.77 (1971). Members of the
Milwaukee Fire Department were not included under these provisions.
24. "Municipal employee" was defined in Wis. STAT. § 111.70(b) (1969) as: "any
employee of a municipal employer except city and village policemen, sheriff's depu-

ties, and county traffic officers."
25. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)j) (1969), provided:
In any case in which a majority of the members of a police or sheriff or
county traffic officer department shall petition the governing body for changes
or improvements in the wages, hours or working conditions and designates a
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traffic officers were denied the right to petition the WERC for
mediation. Firefighters, however, were included in the definition of municipal employees and granted all of the rights and
responsibilities in MERA.28
The 1971 Amendments placed law enforcement personnel,
who formerly had limited rights under MERA, in the forefront of municipal labor relations in Wisconsin, by giving
them access to binding compulsory interest arbitration. The
1971 Amendments also gave firefighters this right. The
amendments were made after vital community services had
been interrupted by strikes of protective services unions.2
These interruptions had indicated to the legislature the need
for a change in the collective bargaining process. 28 The enactment of compulsory final and binding interest arbitration for
firefighting and law enforcement personnel reflected a policy
judgment that the public's right to continued protective services outweighed the union's right to strike.2"
The 1971 Amendments contained a "sunset" provision 0
which was subsequently voided.3 1 The reenactment of these
amendments indicated the willingness of the Wisconsin Legislature to remove the requirement of voluntary settlements in
exchange for an assurance of uninterrupted protective services;3 2 the parties would no longer be required to resolve
their differences between themselves.

representative which may be one of the petitioners or otherwise, the procedures in pars. (e) to (g) shall apply. Such representative may be required by
the commission to post a cash bond in an amount determined by the commission to guarantee payment of one-half of the costs of fact finding.
Wis. STAT. §§ 111.70(4)(e) to .70(4)(g) (1969) governed the fact finding procedure.
26. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(1)(b) (1969).
27. Coughlin & Rader, Right to Strike and Compulsory Arbitration:Panacea or
Placebo? 58 MARQ. L. REv. 205, 207 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Coughlin & Rader].
28. The deficiency of Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (1969) was summarized by one commentator as follows: "If there is no right to strike, no duty on the municipal employees to
bargain in good faith and no binding fact finding, there is no effective way to speedily
resolve the issue that should be resolved between two parties." Spindler, A Need for
Revision in Municipal Labor Law, 43 Wis. Bar Bull. 43, 46 (Aug. 1970).
29. Coughlin & Rader, supra note 27, at 235.
30. 1971 Wis. Laws ch. 247(4).
31. 1973 Wis. Laws ch. 64(4).
32. Coughlin & Rader, supra note 27, at 235.
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4.

1977: MED/ARB
Following the precedent of the 1971 Amendments and responding to the political climate, 3 the Wisconsin Legislature
in 1977 established compulsory final and binding interest arbitration for nearly all municipal employees not governed by
the 1971 Amendments.3 4 In addition, the legislature commissioned a study to evaluate the impact of the the law on municipal governments and municipal labor relations.3 5 The law
contained a "sunset" provision which voids the binding arbitration provisions after October 31, 1981.36
B. Impasse Resolution Procedures Currently Contained in
The Municipal Employment Relations,Act
1.

Mediation.
Mediation has been defined as the "intercession of an impartial third person in a dispute for the purpose of assisting
the parties to resolve their differences voluntarily. 3 7 The
WERC may function as a mediator in labor disputes3 8 or may
designate a person to act as a mediator. This may be done
33. The political climate is demonstrated by the following editorial excerpt:
Lately several newspaper editorials have endorsed compulsory binding arbitration of disputes between public employers and their organized employees.
This smacks of expediency.
The editorials cite the number of public employe strikes since 1962 (105,
they say). Then, along with many others, the editorial writers over-react. They
forget that for every time there has been a strike, there have been hundreds of
times when agreements have been reached peacefully. It would be most unfortunate if the legislature were to enact a compulsory binding arbitration law,
which most informed labor experts agree would seriously undermine the true
collective bargaining process, as a knee-jerk reaction to Hortonville. Yes, the
Hortonville situation was serious and unfortunate, but it has been almost one
of a kind.
69 THE MUNICIPALITY 107 (June 1974).
34. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 178 governs municipal employees other than law enforcement and firefighting'personnel.
35. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 178(15) provides: "The legislative council is directed to
conduct a study of the effect of this act on the collective bargaining process in municipal employment. The study shall evaluate the effect of the act on all aspects of collective bargaining ....
.

36. See note 10 supra.
37. W. MAGGIOLO, TECHNIQUES OF MEDIATION IN LABOR DIsPUTEs 10 (1971).

38. Mediation

is

available

for

municipal

labor

disputes,

Wis.

STAT.
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upon the request of one or both parties or upon the initiation
of the WERC. The function of the mediator is to encourage
voluntary settlement by the parties. The mediator has no
power to compel a settlement, but rather employs the power
of persuasion. Since the adoption of the MED/ARB Law in
1977, the rate for mediations resulting in settlements has been
reduced by nearly half from previous levels.3 9
2.

Fact Finding.

Section 111.70(4)(c)(3) provides that either party, or the
parties jointly, may petition the WERC to initiate fact finding
upon the fulfillment of two conditions: that the dispute has
not been settled after a reasonable period of negotiations; and,
that the settlement procedures, if any, established by the parties have been exhausted. Upon receipt of a petition to initiate fact finding, the WERC will conduct an investigation to
determine whether or not a deadlock, in fact, exists. After its
investigation, the WERC will certify the results. If the WERC
decides that fact finding should be initiated, it will appoint a
qualified, disinterested person or a three member panel, when
jointly requested by the parties, to function as a fact finder.
Section 111.70(4)(c)(3)(b) gives the fact finder the authority
to establish dates and the place of the hearing. The WERC is
authorized to establish rules for the conduct of the hearing
and to issue subpoenas for the hearing, if requested. The fact
finder is required to make written findings of fact and recom§§ 111.70(4)(c)(1), .70(4)(cm)(3)
111.70(4)(c)(4) (1977).

(1977),

39.

except as limited

in

Wis.

STAT.

§

TABLE 3
Percent Municipal

Before MED/ARB Available

Mediation Cases Settled

Fiscal 1973-75
Fiscal 1975-77

87.8%
90.8%

After MED/ARB Available

Mediation Cases Settled

Calendar 1978

52.8%

Calendar 1979

53.7%

Percent Municipal

WISCONSIN CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, INTERIM REPORT TO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SPE-

ciAL CoMMrrEE 1, (APRIL

29, 1980).
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mendations for solution of the dispute and have them served
upon the parties and the WERC.
Within thirty days of the receipt of the fact finder's recommendations, or within the time period mutually agreed upon
by the parties, each party is required to advise the other, in
writing, of its acceptance or rejection, in whole or in part, of
the fact finder's recommendation. In addition, the parties
must send a copy of that notice to the WERC in Madison.
The cost of the fact finder is to be divided equally between
the parties.
The theory behind fact finding has been explained as
follows:
Theoretically, fact-finding in its final stages is a strike
substitute procedure by which dispute issues are set forth,
analyzed and presented to the municipal employer and the
union by the fact finder along with his recommendation for
settlement. The fact finding process was designed to allow
both parties, the municipal employer (elected officials) and
the municipal union, to test the public support for their position by citing the fact finder's recommendations as justification for their bargaining posture. Supposedly, neither the
elected officials nor the union are placed in a decision-making position without the support of the public, the ultimate
40
employer.

As a practical matter, municipal employees and unions
have been reluctant to use fact finding subsequent to the enactment of compulsory binding arbitration. The time, expenses and procedures are similar to arbitration, but the decision is not binding on either party. Furthermore, the fact
finding provision in section 111.70(4)(c) is not available to all
municipal employees covered by the MED/ARB Law.41
3. Compulsory Final and Binding Interest Arbitration of
Disputes Involving Law Enforcement Personnel and
Firefighters.
Section 111.77 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides for
final and binding compulsory interest arbitration of collective
bargaining disputes involving all law enforcement personnel
40. Coughlin & Rader, supra note 27, at 232.
41. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(c)(4) (1977).
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and firefighters in counties and muncipalities (other than the
City of Milwaukee) with a population of 2,500 or more. The
Milwaukee Police are subject to compulsory final and binding
interest arbitration under section 111.70(4)(jm).
Section 111.77 requires that the party desiring to modify
or terminate a contract must serve written notice upon the
other party of the proposed termination or modification 180
days prior to the expiration of the contract. If the contract
date contains no expiration date, this notice must be given
sixty days prior to the time proposed that such termination or
modification take place. The party desiring to modify or terminate the contract must notify the WERC of the existence of
a dispute within ninety days after the notice provided for
above is given. The contract existing between the parties remains in full force and effect without the union resorting to
strikes or the municipal employer to lockouts for a period of
sixty days after notice is given to the WERC of the existence
of a dispute or until the expiration date of a contract, whichever occurs later. The WERC may also require that the parties participate in mediation sessions. If the parties have provided for voluntary impasse resolution procedures, these must
be exhausted before petitioning the WERC for compulsory
final and binding arbitration.
Either party may petition for arbitration with the WERC
which will then investigate and determine whether impasse
has been reached. In addition, the WERC may conduct further mediation. If the WERC determines that an impasse has
been reached, it shall issue an order for arbitration. The
WERC then submits a panel of five arbitrators and the parties alternately strike four of the five. The remaining person is
appointed by the WERC as the arbitrator. The parties share
the arbitrator's expenses equally.
Two forms of arbitration are defined in section 111.77(4):
Form One allows the arbitrator to determine all issues in dispute involving wages, hours and conditions of employment.
Under this procedure, the arbitrator determines each issue in
dispute on an individual basis. As a result, under this form
the arbitrator has the right to split the award. Form Two requires that the parties submit their final offer to the investigator appointed by the WERC. The arbitrator thereafter selects
one of the two final offers as the final award. Form Two is
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utilized unless the parties agree to use Form One. 42 Under either form, the arbitrator is required to give weight to specific
factors in reaching a decision.43
4. Compulsory Final and Binding Interest Arbitration of
Disputes Involving Municipal Employees Other Than Law
Enforcement Personnel and Firefighters.
The MED/ARB Law provides compulsory interest arbitration for nonprotective-services municipal employees. After advising the WERC of the commencement of contract negotiations, the parties must begin their collective bargaining with
an initial open session. This meeting is held for the purpose of
presenting the initial bargaining proposals and the supporting
rationale so as to inform the public. However, failure to comply with this open meeting requirement is not cause to invalidate a collective bargaining agreement negotiated under
MERA.4 4
Section 111.70(4)(cm) provides for mediation, grievance ar42. Wis. STAT. § 111.77(5) (1977).
.43. Wis. STAT. § 111.77(6) (1977) provides:
In reaching a decision the arbitrator shall give weight to the following
factors:
(a) The lawful authority of the employer.
(b) Stipulations of the parties.
(c) The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the
unit of government to meet these costs.
(d) Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours and conditions of employment of other employes performing similar services and with
other employes generally:
1. In public employment in comparable communities.
2. In private employment in comparable communities.
(e) The average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly known as
the cost of living.
(f) The overall compensation presently received by the employes, including
direct wage compensation, vacation, holidays and excused time, insurance and
pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, the continuity and stability of
employment, and all other benefits received.
(g) Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of the
arbitration proceedings.
(h) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or
traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours,
and conditions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, fact finding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in the public
service or in private employment.
44. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(cm)(2) (1977).
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bitration and other voluntary impasse resolution procedures.
Voluntary impasse procedures are permissive subjects of bargaining and such negotiated procedures must be filed with the
WERC. The parties may agree to any form of binding interest
arbitration; however, the factors which the arbitrator
should
5
consider in making a decision may not be altered.4
The MED/ARB process is initiated by either party's filing
of a petition with the WERC. If a dispute has not been settled
after a reasonable period of negotiations and the parties continue deadlocked with respect to any dispute concerning
wages, hours and conditions of employment, the MED/ARB
process may be commenced. Upon receipt of the petition for
MED/ARB, the WERC is required to make an investigation
to determine whether an impasse exists and whether there has
been statutory compliance. Prior to the close of the investigation, each party is required to submit in writing a single final
offer containing its final proposals on all unresolved issues and
disputes. Final offers will only be accepted by the investigator
where an impasse does in fact exist. The investigator will allow the parties to modify their final offers until he determines
that the offers are final.
Final offers normally include only mandatory subjects of
bargaining. Permissive subjects of bargaining, however, may
be included by a party if the other party does not object. The
WERC normally requests a stipulation, in writing, with respect to all matters which are agreed upon for inclusion in the
new or amended collective bargaining agreement. After receiving a report from its investigator and determining that the
MED/ARB process should proceed, the WERC issues an order requiring MED/ARB and submits a list of five mediator/
arbitrators. Upon receipt of such list, the parties alternately
strike names until a single name is left. The remaining person
is appointed as mediator/arbitrator.
Sections 111.70(4)(cm)(6)(b) and (c) provide the framework in which the mediator/arbitrator functions. Within ten
days of his or her appointment, the mediator/arbitrator will
establish dates and places for the conduct of the MED/ARB
session. Upon the petition of at least five citizens of the jurisdiction served by the municipal employer, filed within ten
45. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(cm)(5)

(1977).

1980]

MUNICIPAL LABOR LAW

days of the date on which the mediator/arbitrator was appointed, the arbitrator is required to hold a public hearing.
This hearing provides an opportunity for both parties to explain or present supporting arguments for their positions and
for members of the public to ask questions and offer their
comments and suggestions.
The final offers of the parties serve as the basis for mediation and continued negotiations between the parties with respect to the issues in dispute. The mediator/arbitrator may
attempt to mediate the dispute and encourage a voluntary
settlement by the parties. Neither party, without the consent
of the other party during this final mediation attempt, may
modify its final offer.
If the parties are not able to reach a voluntary settlement,
the mediator/arbitrator provides written notification to the
parties and the WERC of his or her intent to resolve the dispute by final and binding arbitration. Thereafter, either party
may, within the time limit established by the mediator/arbitrator, withdraw its final offer. A party provides written notice
of such withdrawal to the other party, the mediator/arbitrator
and the WERC. If both parties withdraw their final offers and
mutually agreed upon modifications, the labor organization
may strike after giving ten days written advance notice to the
municipal employer and the WERC. Unless both parties withdraw their final offers, the final offer shall not be deemed
withdrawn and the mediator/arbitrator shall proceed to resolve the dispute by final and binding arbitration.
The mediator/arbitrator acting as arbitrator shall adopt
without further modification the final offer of one of the parties on all disputed issues. Section 111.70(4)(cm)(7) requires
that the mediator/arbitrator, in making any decision, must
give weight to the following factors:
a. The lawful authority of the municipal employer.
b. Stipulations of the parties.
c. The interests and welfare of the public and the
financial ability of the unit of government to meet the costs
of any proposed settlement.
d. Comparison of wages, hours and conditions of employment of the municipal employes involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours and conditions of employment of other employees performing similar services
and with other employees generally in public employment in
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the same community and in comparable communities and in
private employment in the same community and in comparable communities.
e. The average consumer prices for goods and services
commonly known as the cost-of-living.
f. The overall compensation, presently received by the
municipal employees, including direct wage compensation,
vacation, holidays and excused times, insurance and pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, the continuity
and stability of employment, and all other benefits received.
g. Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during
the pendency of the arbitration proceedings.
h. Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing,
which are normally or traditionally taken into consideration
in the determination of wages, hours and conditions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in the public service or in private employment.

III. AN EVALUATION OF COMPULSORY FINAL AND BINDING
INTEREST ARBITRATION FOR MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES OTHER

THAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FIREFIGHTING PERSONNEL

An evaluation of the MED/ARB Law begins with a determination of its impact on collective bargaining. The evaluation must include an analysis of compulsory arbitration's effect on local government, municipal employees and ultimately
the public. A more limited analysis would ignore the farreaching effect of chapter 178.
The role of collective bargaining in the operation of municipal government is significant. Decisions once made exclusively by local officials are now a part of the collective bargaining process. For example:
The right of the employer to make the initial selection of
individuals for jobs is still universally recognized. In other
areas collective bargaining has completely bypassed the existing personnel system. In some governmental units agreements provided something like a local personnel system for
the first time. In the larger jurisdictions, collective bargaining has required an intricate meshing of traditional civil
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service goals with procedures evolved through collective
bargaining.4

The WERC and the courts have properly limited the scope
of collective bargaining through a strict adherence to the prin4
ciples of mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. 7
Nevertheless, because of the widespread unionization of municipal employees, every citizen has a stake in the functioning

46. Donoghue, Local Government in Wisconsin, in WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, 1979-80 BLUE BOOK 99, 194 (1979).
47. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(1)(d) (1977) limits the scope of bargaining as follows:
"Collective bargaining" means the performance of the mutual obligation of
municipal employer, through its officers and agents, and the representatives of
its employes, to meet and confer at reasonable times, in good faith, with respect to wages, hours and conditions of employment with the intention of
reaching an agreement, or to resolve questions arising under such an agreement. The duty to bargain, however, does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession. Collective bargaining includes
the reduction of any agreement reached to a written and signed document. The
employer shall not be required to bargain on subjects reserved to management
and direction of the governmental unit except insofar as the manner of exercise of such functions affects the wages, hours and conditions of employment of
the employes. In creating this subchapter the legislature recognizes that the
public employer must exercise its powers and responsibilities to act for the
government and good order to the municipality, its commercial benefit and the
health, safety and welfare of the public to assure orderly operations and functions within its jurisdiction, subject to those rights secured to public employes
by the constitutions of this state and of the United States and by this
subchapter.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court clarified this definition of the scope of bargaining in
Beloit Educ. Ass'n. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 54, 242
N.W.2d 231, 236 (1976):
The dictionary defines "primarily" as meaning "fundamentally." It is in this
sense of the word that "primarily" is here used. What is fundamentally or basically or essentially a matter involving "wages, hours and conditions of employment" is, under the statute, a matter that is required to be bargained. The
commission construed the Statute to require mandatory bargaining as to (1)
matters which are primarily related to "wages, hours and conditions of employment," and (2) the impact of the "establishment of the educational policy"
affecting the "wages, hours and conditions of employment." We agree with that
construction.
(footnotes omitted)(emphasis in original).
See also Unified School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm'n, 81 Wis. 2d 89,
259 N.W.2d 724 (1977) and City of Brookfield v. Wisconsin Employment Rel.
Comm'n, 87 Wis. 2d 819, 275 N.W.2d 723 (1979).
For a thorough discussion of the topic see Vetter, The Development of the Definition of Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining Since the Enactment of the Municipal
Employment Relations Act in 1971, in MUNICIPAL LABOR RELATIONS IN WISCONSIN 73
(C. Mulcahy ed. 1979).
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of MERA in Wisconsin.4 8 This becomes obvious when one
considers the fact that employee wages and benefits constitute
between sixty percent and eighty percent of nearly every municipal budget.4 9 Thus, decisions arrived at over the bargaining table have a direct and immediate impact on a municipality's public services, tax rate, and distribution of local
resources.
Municipal labor problems are most effectively resolved in
collective bargaining. Effective long term public employment
relationships are built upon mutual trust and understanding.
This relationship should remain at arm's length at all times,
and no attempt should be made to undermine the other side.
Trickery and intentional omissions may prove temporarily
satisfying but are ultimately counterproductive. Once a relationship is impaired it is extremely difficult to rebuild.
Collective bargaining under MERA does not require either
party to agree to proposals of the other.50 The parties negoti48. The following statistics indicate the widespread unionization of municipal
employees:
Number and Percent of Public Employes Represented by Labor
Organizations
By Level and Type of Organization
Wisconsin, 1972-1976 (in Thousands of Full-Time Employees)
TABLE 4

1976 Employes

1974 Employes

Represented

1972 Employes

Represented

Represented

Level or

Type

Total

Number

%

Total

Number

%

Total

Number

%

State

48.3

24.6

51.0

46.1

26.2

56.8

47.1

16.8

35.7

Local

(149.2)

(94.6)

(63.4)

(145.3)

(89.3)

(61.5)

(134.8)

(86.8)

(64.4)

34.1
54.9

19.3
36.8

56.7
66.9

31.7
55.5

18.7
33.7

59.0
60.7

30.0
50.7

15.6
35.3

52.0
69.6

1.9

0.2

10.5

1.8

0.2

11.1

2.1

0.1

4.8

57.5
0.7

38.0
0.4

66.1
57.1

55.7
0.6

36.3
0.4

65.2
66.7

51.3
0.6

35.3
0.4

68.8
66.7

197.5

119.2

60.4

191.5

115.5

60.3

181.9

103.4

56.8

County
Municipalities..
Town

School District.
Special District
TOTAL

Source: Data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Figures may not add because of rounding. Data is as of

October 1. for the years indicated. "Municipalities" figure includes employes of dependent school
systems.

BUREAU, 1979-80 BLUE BOOK 195 (1979).
49. Mulcahy & Schilling, The Impact of Labor Relations on Municipal Finance,
in MUNICIPAL LAoB RELATIONS IN WISCONSIN 31, 33 (C. Mulcahy ed. 1979).
50. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(1)(d) (1977) provides: "The duty to bargain ... does not

WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE

1980]

MUNICIPAL LABOR LAW

ate a supportable, voluntary agreement. Collective bargaining
allows all the parties to maintain local control of the decisionmaking process. Absent compulsory interest arbitration, the
parties negotiate in a power relationship. The municipal employer's power as management is balanced with the union's
power as a representative of the employees. This power relationship has not, however, been fully developed in MERA.
The right of a union to strike is a necessary component to
balance the relationship between municipal employers and
public employee unions. Absent this right, unions are without
the leverage which traditionally has been available to their
private sector counterparts. As a result of this denial, the public sector collective bargaining process remained unbalanced
until public employee unions resorted to illegal strikes. The
legislature then enacted compulsory final and binding arbittration to eliminate these strikes. Unfortunately, MERA has
not eliminated illegal public employee strike3.5 1
Compulsory binding interest arbitration has a devastating
effect on collective bargaining. It has diminished the effectiveness of public sector collective bargaining and has made local
municipal governments and elected officials less accountable
to the public.5 2 The imposition of a settlement taints the process and diminishes the incentive to settle voluntarily:
One alternative ... is to provide for compulsory binding
arbitration of all bargaining impasses. We are opposed to
this approach since we feel that, among other things, corn-

compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."
51. There were seven illegal public employee strikes during 1978 and 1979: (1) the
Fond du Lac County institutions were struck from June 12, 1978 to July 1, 1978 by
aids and; (2) by LPNs and by RNs; (3) Stevens Point Schools were struck on September 26, 1978 by 25 of 65 busdrivers; (4) the Union Grove High School District was
struck on September 28, 1979 by two units of employees; (5) in the City of Appleton a
WERC examiner found that a strike occurred during February 1978; (6) the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District was struck by 310 operators and non-craft employees beginning on October 15, 1979 and concluding on November 7, 1979 with the
granting of an injunction by the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County; and (7) the
Douglas County highway workers went on a wildcat strike on December 31, 1979.
WISCONSIN CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, INTERIM REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
SPECIAL COMMITTEE 50, 51 (April 29, 1980).
At the time of this writing it would appear that there have been two strikes in
1980 in Wisconsin:(1) a busdrivers strike in the Riverdale (Muscoda) School District;
and (2) a two-day walkout by Milwaukee County welfare workers.
52. See text accompanying notes 60-63 infra.
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pulsory binding arbitration is likely to retard the give and
take inherent in the bargaining process. Why should the
parties make a sincere effort to compromise during bargaining when by doing so they may prejudice their respective
positions if and when they find themselves before an
arbitrator? 5
The spirit and intent of Wisconsin public employee laws is
frustrated with this approach. The parties are even refusing to
tentatively approve matters resolved in negotiations for fear
of prejudicing their positions in arbitration.
The substitution of compulsory interest arbitration for the
right of public employee unions to strike5 inherently weakens
collective bargaining. Arbitration does not replace the natural
pressures on the parties to settle when a strike is a realistic
future possibility. Public employees can and will strike regardless of statutory prohibitions and penalties. 5 Because the
dynamics of collective bargaining are missing, arbitration is
not an effective method of municipal labor dispute
resolution.5 6
The effect of the MED/ARB Law extends beyond collective bargaining. MED/ARB has threatened the foundation of
representative government on the municipal level in
Wisconsin:
In a period when public confidence in government is already at a low point, this kind of decision-making [compulsory arbitration] by wayfaring strangers, not chosen or accountable to the electorate, can only contribute to further
alienation from government and growing questions about
the actual nature of representative government."
53. Dr. H. Wise, Past President of the National Education Association in testimony on October 4, 1973, before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, reprinted in COALITION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EMPLOYREs, A FEDERAL BARGAINING Acr FOR STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 27
(1973).
54. Although 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 178 allows a limited right to strike, it has not
been successfully invoked to date.
55. See note 51 supra.
56. Although chapter 178 was heralded by the press as a law granting the right to
strike for public employees, its practical application has exposed this as a misnomer.
In practice, the law has operated to effectively preclude the ability of public employees to strike. This is evidenced by the complete absence of legal public employee
strikes since the adoption of chapter 178.
57. Address by Sam Zagoria, Director of Labor Management Relations Services of
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When critical decisions5" are made for municipal governments
by unelected and unaccountable people, the needs and priorities of the local citizens are often forgotten and misplaced.5 e
the U.S. Conference of Mayors, given at the LMRS-American Arbitration Association
Joint Conference (Feb. 14-15, 1977), reprinted in 696 Gov'T EmPI. REL. REP. (BNA)
17 (1977).

58. The following indicates the number and type of issues awarded under MED/
ARB during 1978 and 1979:
TABLE 5
A. Number of Issues per Award in 1978 and 1979.
Number of Issues

1

2

1978

13

1979

15

Total

28

3

4

5

5+

Not
Clear

8

2

2

2

12

6

9.

11

3

4

16

7

17

13

5

6

28

13

Number of Awards

B. Number of Times in Med/Arb Awards in 1978 and 1979.
Issue

1978

1979

Total

Wage/Salary

33

48

81

Fair Share

17

18

35

Health Insurance

13

13

26

Retirement

6

6

12

Holidays

5

3

8

Vacation

5

3

8

Dental Insurance

5

3

8

Extra Duty

5

14

19

Longevity

0

4

4

Just Cause

0

5

5

Layoff

0

10

10

Duration

4

6

10

Calendar

5

6

11

Transfers

0

4

4

WISCONSIN CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, INTERIM REPORT TO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SPE-

COMMITTEE 11 (April 29, 1980).
59. A review of the credentials of Wisconsin arbitrators as distributed by the
WERC indicates that few, if any, have been an elected or appointed municipal officIAL
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PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT

RELATIONS ACT

A. A Substantive Change to Strengthen MERA
Procedural changes to MERA cannot appreciably
strengthen collective bargaining or return accountability to
municipal governments. Rather, a substantive change is necessary whereby municipal governments would have the option
to reject binding arbitration with a corresponding acknowledgement of municipal employees' right to strike.60 This proposal would return effective collective bargaining to MERA
and return local control to municipal government.
The change would allow local officials to decide whether or
not to risk a strike in lieu of arbitration. If the municipality
would decide against the use of arbitration, collective bargaining would become the focal point of the pressures inherent in

a dynamic state of affairs. The addition of the strike possibility balances the equation and provides all of the components
necessary for healthy collective bargaining:
Isn't the strike a part of the collective bargaining process? A
cial. In addition, few arbitrators reside in the municipality to which they are called to
issue an award. These arbitrators make decisions with a lasting impact upon the local
community, as described by Raymond D. Horton:
Particularly in interest arbitration, neutrals should recognize that this function
often goes far beyond the task of resolving an immediate impasse, for their
decisions may also produce systemic impacts that spread beyond the immediate labor relations dispute. Changes in labor costs, for example, may affect
inputs (taxes) and outputs (services). Thus it would seem that an arbitrator, in
order to properly gauge what (future) systemic as opposed to (immediate) situational, consequences are likely to result from his or her decision, should possess some understanding of the interplay over time among variables such as
labor costs, governmental revenue and expenditure patterns, taxes, employment levels, work rules, and productivity.
Horton, Arbitration, Arbitrators and the Public Interest, 28 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
497, 504 (1975).
60. The approach would allow local government officials to reject binding arbitration. Upon rejection of the union's arbitration petition, the union would no longer be
prohibited from engaging in a strike. However, if the employer petitions for arbitration or accepts the union's request for same, strikes would be prohibited and the
arbitrator would make a binding award. The proposal would allow a right to strike by
unions where local elected officials believe that the public interest would not be
served by submission to binding arbitration. At the same time, where a strike would
be against the public interest as determined by local officials, the option of proceeding to compulsory and binding arbitration would be available. This proposal would
only apply to municipal employees other than law enforcement and firefighting
personnel.
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strike isn't a tragedy; it doesn't signal the demise of collective bargaining. It is... a far better alternative in the short
term than the long term effect of compulsory and binding
arbitration which removes the ultimate solution to be
reached at the bargaining table."'

If elected officials would choose to reject binding arbitration and thus free the union to strike, leverage would come to
bear on both parties and would encourage a voluntary settlement of the dispute. If a strike did occur, the public would
ultimately hold the parties accountable for the interruption of
services. If local officials would decide to proceed to arbitration, then they would also be held accountable to the public
for the result. The present law practically precludes public accountability since the imposition of MED/ARB removes local
decision making and places the decision in the hands of an
unelected third party.
Municipal officials and some union leaders believe that the

MED/ARB Law has an adverse effect on collective bargaining.62 The experience under MERA would suggest that the ex61. Address by Donald Weinberg, Past President of the National Public Employer
Labor Relations Association, given at the annual meeting of the NPELRA (March 611, 1977), reprinted in 702 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 13 (1977).
62. On September 3, 1980, the Wisconsin Valley Mayors Organization passed a
resolution opposing the reenactment of MED/ARB in Wisconsin.
The recent busdrivers strike in Madison demonstrates the unwillingness of unions
to participate in binding arbitration. After Mayor Joel Skornicka called for binding
arbitration, Teamsters Union Local 695 Secretary, Robert Rutland, responded as follows: "Teamsters Union Local 695 does not consider it (binding arbitration) as a viable alternative to our established collective-bargaining process. We will not relinquish
our duty of fair representation to a third party." Wis. St. J., June 7, 1980, pt. 4, at 1,
col. 1. Madison bus drivers were not subject to MED/ARB because technically they
are not government employees, since Madison contracts with a management firm to
operate the bus utility.
A more telling example is provided by examining the initial proposal of a municipal employees union in Wisconsin. At the first meeting between the parties held on
July 24, 1980, the union, representing the Price County courthouse and highway employees presented the following joint proposal:
Article 23 - Duration and Bargaining Procedure:
Add to Section B. a new step 4. "In the event the parties cannot reach agreement on a successor agreement by December 31, it is agreed that the parties
will enter into around the clock negotiations beginning January 1, for a period
of 72 hours. If a successor agreement is not reached, the parties agree the
employees may then take the option to either continue negotiations or exercise the right to strike."
(emphasis added).
See also text accompanying note 53 supra.
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perimental MED/ARB Law be rejected. Instead, a renewed
system of public sector collective bargaining should be
adopted:
[A]n a prioriban on all public employee strikes regardless of
circumstances and regardless of impact is not only inequitable.., but is, in addition, empirically unsound. They [the
facts] point to a need for flexibility - for a system which
provides a motive for good faith collective bargaining; which
allows for the assessment of relative fault if bargaining
breaks down and a strike occurs; and which permits the development of a remedy that is appropriate to the facts in
each case."3
The adoption by the legislature of the proposed change
would have a far-reaching and immediate impact. Mediation
would regain its former importance as a method of impasse
resolution, relying on Wisconsin's tradition of highly talented
third-party mediators. Settlements would be reached under
the pressure of meaningful negotiations. Third parties would
not impose settlements unless called upon by local elected officials accountable to the public.
B. ProceduralChanges to Improve the MEDIARB Law
The extension of the right of public employees to strike
and the curtailment of compulsory final and binding interest
arbitration is the surest way to strengthen collective bargaining under MERA. Regardless of any substantive change involving the right to strike, however, certain procedural
changes should be made to the MED/ARB Law.
1. The Public's Right to Know
Under current procedures, the parties must present and
explain their initial proposals in an open meeting."' The par63. Dr. H. Wise, Past President of the National Education Association in testimony on October 4, 1973, before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, reprinted in COALITION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, A FEDERAL BARGAINING ACT FOR STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 28
(1973).
64. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(cm)(2) (1977) provides:
Presentation of initial proposals; Open meetings. The meetings between parties
to a collective bargaining agreement or proposed collective bargaining agreement under this subchapter which are held for the purpose of presenting initial
bargaining proposals, along with supporting rationale, shall be open to the
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ties often are unprepared to respond to the proposals of the
other side since they are unaware of the proposals. As a result,
the parties and the public are denied an important opportunity to participate in constructive dialogue as the meeting
often degenerates into one-sided orations. If the exchange
were required to occur at least two weeks before the initial
open session, 5 the parties could be prepared to engage in an

informed discussion of the issues and an analysis of areas
needing clarification. Legislation adopting this proposal would
also provide the public with an opportunity to observe such

dialogue. This proposal is clearly in the public interest.
2.

Expediting Mediation

While MERA presently provides three periods during
which mediation may take place, 8 its effectiveness during the
first two stages is questionable. The WERC investigator's attempt to mediate the dispute in the first two stages is often

frustrated by parties who are biding their time in order to be
able to save movement for later mediation efforts by the mediator/arbitrator. In an effort to maintain an advantageous
bargaining position, the parties often postpone compromises.
This significantly diminishes the WERC investigator's success. Unfortunately, the vast amount of experience and expertise brought to the mediation session by the WERC investigator is lost in this futile attempt to mediate.
If the third-stage mediation attempt by the mediator/arbi-

trator were eliminated, the arbitration process would be expepublic. Each party shall submit its initial bargaining proposals to the other
party in writing. Failure to comply with this subdivision is not cause to invalidate a collective bargaining agreement under this subchapter.
65. The order of exchange should be determined by the parties. This could be
accomplished by making it a mandatory subject of bargaining.
66. Upon the filing of a petition for mediation under Wis. STAT.
§ 111.70(4)(cm)(3) (1977) by one or both parties, the WERC will appoint a mediator.
The WERC mediator will attempt to mediate the dispute and bring the parties to a
voluntary settlement. This first stage is usually skipped under current practice, and
no changes in it are proffered.
If this mediation is unsuccessful, the parties may request, singularly or jointly,
mediation/arbitration pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(cm)(6) (1977). The WERC
will then appoint an investigator who will again try to mediate. If he is unsuccessful
in this second stage, he will supervise exchange of the final offers of the parties and
file a report with the WERC. The law then empowers the mediator/arbitrator to attempt a voluntary settlement by mediating the dispute.
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dited. The arbitration hearing could be scheduled at a specific
time with no fear that mediation attempts by the mediator/
arbitrator would unduly delay the process. Mediation attempts by the WERC investigator would assume greater significance if it were understood that the mediator/arbitrator
would not engage in mediation.
In addition to expediting the process, another advantage
could be realized by eliminating the third mediation attempt.
Under the MED/ARB Law, the involvement of the mediator/
arbitrator in mediation may color the resulting arbitration
award. The parties are highly suspicious that it is humanly
impossible for the mediator/arbitrator to ignore the impact of
one party's inability to compromise from its final offer position even though the full extent of its compromise was offered
in an earlier mediation stage. Eliminating the mediation effort
of the mediator/arbitrator would preclude such suspicion and
instill more confidence in the process.
3. A Standard Procedure for Exchange of Final Offers
An investigator assigned by the WERC must determine
whether a bargaining impasse exists before proceeding to
MED/ARB.6 7 The investigators frequently utilize different

procedures in collecting final offers from the parties. Because
some investigators have requested a series of "final offers,"
the parties are often unable to determine the status of the
proceedings. The uncertainty in this stage often leads to
gamesmanship in structuring a final offer with the hope of
emerging victorious in the arbitration. Such tactics are inconsistent with the spirit and efficient functioning of MERA.
Therefore, the MED/ARB Law should provide a uniform procedure to expedite the process and minimize gamesmanship.
4. Amending Final Offers Prior to Hearings
Under the present law, the arbitrator must consider several factors in making a decision 8 These factors can change
during the time between the certification of the final offer and
the date of the arbitration hearing. This span of time may extend to three or four months. During this period, changes fre67. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)(cm)(6)(a) (1977).
68. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
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quently occur concerning the cost of living, comparisons with
other governmental and private operations, and the financial
status of the governmental unit. For example, the state often
does not determine its aid formula and funding for school districts, which leaves grave uncertainties in the school district's
revenue side of the budget. This has an impact upon the district's ability to pay an award, which will be considered by the
arbitrator.
The reasonableness of the final offers should not hinge on
the ability of the parties to forecast economic, social or political change. Because the parties should control the reasonableness of their final offers, amendments should be allowed three
weeks prior to the arbitration hearing.
5.

The Public Welfare as a Required Statutory Factor
In the gamesmanship of the MED/ARB process, the ultimate welfare of individual communities is overlooked. Decisions are made primarily in terms of what would be fair and
equitable for employees based upon the comparables and
other factors which are unrelated to the public welfare. Arbitrators should be required to consider the public welfare as a
factor, particularly where the award would have a significant
negative impact on the local community. For example, awards
which have the effect of requiring the laying off of significant
numbers of employees, closing down of buildings or eliminating of programs certainly have this type of negative impact.
The arbitrator should be required to evaluate whether the
award is justified based upon the public welfare of the
community.
6.

Strengthening Strike Penalties
The strike penalties for public sector employees set forth
in section 111.70(7m)(c) are weak and uncertain. Neither the
labor organization nor the individual employees are subject to
fines for illegal strikes until after the employer obtains an injunction. 9 The union and the employees can escape liability
69. The- equitable remedy of injunctive relief is authorized in Wis.

STAT.

§ 111.70(7m)(a) (1977) which provides:

At any time after the commencement of a strike which is prohibited under
sub. (4)(L), the municipal employer or any citizen directly affected by such
strike may petition the circuit court for an injunction to immediately termi-
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by merely returning to work after the injunction is issued.
The forfeiture of pay for those days on strike may be the only
sanction. This enables the union or its members, prior to an
injunction, to engage in illegal activities and gain the advantage of leveraging the employer without being penalized.
Perhaps the most important misconception associated with
the strike penalty under section 111.70(7m)(c)(1)(a) involves
the suspension of any dues check offs or fair share agreements. On its face, the statute would appear to provide an
automatic penalty associated with all strikes. However, under
the definition of "strikes" set forth in section 111.70(1)(nm),
all conduct which is not authorized or condoned by a labor
organization does not subject such labor organization to the
penalties of the MED/ARB Law. Labor organizations may be
able to avoid all penalties by merely telling all members that
they cannot strike under the law and that the labor organization will not authorize, condone or support any such activities.
Under these circumstances, a clever union could avoid penalties or sanctions against it.
In order to balance the inequities and inhibit unions and
employees from engaging in illegal strikes, the following revisions should be made to MERA: (1) all fines and penalties be
retroactive to the first day of a strike after an injunction is
granted; (2) in the event of a strike or work stoppage of any
kind, the union and its individual members be responsible for
payment of the prevailing party's attorney's fees and costs incurred in dealing with the strike. The number and type of
strikes occurring since the adoption of the MED/ARB Law70
requires these changes.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has outlined the evolution of public sector
collective bargaining in Wisconsin. This evolution has resulted
in what the authors consider to be some of the most sophistinate the strike. If the court determines that the strike is prohibited under sub.
(4)(L), it shall issue an order immediately enjoining the strike, and in addition
shall impose the penalties provided in par. (c).
See generally Wherry, Strikes, Injunctions and Contempt Proceedings,in MUNICIPAL
LABOR RELATIONS IN WISCONSIN 205 (C. Mulcahy ed. 1979), for a thorough analysis of
strikes, injunctions and contempt proceedings.
70. See note 51 supra.
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cated labor agreements in the United States. Unlike the parties' bargaining militancy and resistance in the late 60's and
early 70's, in most instances now the parties have assumed a
more mature, problem-solving attitude which has resulted in
stability. The MED/ARB Law has added a dimension of complexity which has not resulted in effective, timely and equitable collective bargaining. Due to the technical nature of the
process, the parties have found it increasingly difficult to adequately protect their interests. Considerable emphasis is now
placed upon strategy, comparables and timing. The law has
not encouraged the parties to voluntarily resolve municipal labor problems. Rather, the parties are now involved in a competitive situation where gamesmanship,7 1 rather than statesmanship, is becoming increasingly prevalent. This is contrary
to the spirit and intent of MERA in Wisconsin. 2
The MED/ARB Law has weakened the effectiveness of
collective bargaining, diminished the accountability of local
elected officials and eroded the responsiveness of municipal
government to the needs of the public. As the date of the
"sunset" provision draws near, the Wisconsin Legislature has
an opportunity to restore true public sector collective bargaining and encourage the voluntary resolution of labor disputes.
This can only be accomplished by curtailing the use of compulsory final and binding interest arbitration and expanding
the right of certain public employees to strike. In so doing, the
interests of the public will be served by encouraging a dy71. For example, there are few inducements for the public employee union to voluntarily accept the final position of the municipal employer, since if the union loses
the arbitration, the very least it will obtain is the final offer of the municipal employer. This can accurately be described as a "can't lose" situation which encourages
the union to resort to arbitration. The authors do not believe that the municipal employer can always effectively structure a final offer which discourages such
gamesmanship.
72. See Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 37 Wis. 2d 483,
493, 155 N.W.2d 78, 83 (1967) (quoting with approval the following passage from
Mulcahy, A Municipality's Rights and Responsibilities Under Wisconsin Municipal
Labor Law, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 512, 513 (1966)):
Government officials must exercise greater flexibility and ingenuity, therefore,
to arrive at a workable procedure for dealing with municipal labor matters.
The only alternative is to resist application of the existing law. Arguments of
unconstitutionality (illegal delegation and challenge of sovereignty) may sound
temporarily appealing to a government official who is set in his ways but judicial rulings are steadfastly affirming municipal labor legislation.
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namic and workable
bargaining:

system of public sector
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collective

[W]e should be encouraging the process of collective bargaining.... It works, we know it works, we should do everything possible to make it work. And we should remove every
impediment to collective bargaining that exists. Most particularly we should remove compulsory arbitration....

[T]he

central theme of the State's Labor laws must be collective
bargaining. This is the key to the reasonable employee relations in the public sector in this state. We must not destroy
collective bargaining with compulsory arbitration and 73we
must not destroy it with lopsided changes in labor laws.
Regardless of any substantive change curtailing the use of
MED/ARB and expanding the right of certain public employees to strike, procedural changes should be made in the MED/
ARB Law:
1. The initial proposals of the parties should be exchanged
two weeks prior to the initial open bargaining session.
2. The process should be expedited by eliminating the mediation by the arbitrator.
3. Standard procedures should be adopted for the exchange of final offers.
4. Final offers should be amendable three weeks prior to
the arbitration hearing.
5. The public welfare should always be a factor to be given
serious consideration by the arbitrator.
6. Penalties for illegal strikes should be strengthened.
The Wisconsin Legislature anticipated and provided for a
careful review of the new MED/ARB Law by enacting a "sunset" provision. This review should come to the conclusion that
the parties should voluntarily resolve their differences at the
bargaining table. MED/ARB should be curtailed and the right
of certain public employees to strike should be expanded.
These changes would place significant pressure upon the parties to reach voluntary agreements and thereby restore ultimate control of local government to the people - where it
belongs.

73. Address by Coleman A. Young, Mayor of the City of Detroit, given at a Legislative Forum on New Directions for Public Employee Labor Relations, reprinted in
11 LABOR MANAGEMENT REL. SERV. NEWSLETTER, No. 5, at 3 (United States Conference of Mayors, May 1980).

